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Plato on the Souls of Beasts
Eve Browning Cole
University of Minnesota, Duluth
SAGP Central, Chicago; April 26, 1991
What, according to Plato, are the most significant differences
between human beings and non-human animals?

Among ancient Greek

thinkers who devoted themselves to the project of explaining human
nature and reflecting on the peculiarities of human existence,
Plato would seem to have been particularly well-placed to render a
clear and decisive distinction between humans and beasts.
emphasis

on the

centrality

of reason

in human

life,

For his
and his

repeatedly articulated faith in the immortality of the human soul,
would appear to mark humans off from other animals once and for
all.

And there are certainly passages within the dialogues which

seem to imply that Plato is secure in such distinctions.
example,

For

in the etymology of άνθρωπος in Cratvlus. we find the

following;
The name "human being" (άνθρωπος) means this: the other
animals (τα μέν ά λ λ α θ η ρ ί α ) do not reflect on or analyze
or look up to (άναθρεί) that which they see; but a human
being no sooner sees something - that is, observes it
(δπωπε), than he looks up at and reflects on that which
he has seen.
Thus the human being alone is rightly
called άνθρωπος, looking up at what is seen (άναθρών a
δπωπε).
(Crat.399CÍ-6)
Beneath the befuddling glitziness of this etymology there lies a
substantive philosophical claim: that for humans, perception is an
occasion for reflection and further inquiry, "looking up" from the
perceived object to the conceptual framework into which it will
fit; for "the other animals", however, the mere seeing is the end
1
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of the mental process.

On such a foundation, a clear distinction

between humans and non-human animals based on their cognitive
capacities could be readily constructed.
However, a survey of the Platonic texts which deal directly
with

the

"soul

of the beast"

yields

some material

complicate the clarity of this bifurcation.

which may

This potentially

complicating material is of several different varieties:

(1) Some

passages seem to ascribe to non-human animals cognitive and moral
capabilities

which

are

human-like;

(2)

In

discussing

the

transmigration of the soul, Plato seems ready to countenance humanto-animal and animal-to-human transits; and (3) Plato repeatedly
states that certain human lives are beast-like or (worse still) are
actually beast's lives (whatever this may mean).

In this paper I

will explore the complicating text-groups of types

(1) and

(3)

above, hoping to achieve some clarity on Plato's general position
regarding the affinities and distances between the human and the
beast.1

The value

of

such a project

lies

ultimately

in

its

potential for illuminating Plato's view of human nature itself, and
of our place in the natural world at large.

Section I: Courageous and Clever Beasts?
In the Laches. no finally satisfactory definition of courage
is found.

But the most promising candidate provokes a brief

controversy regarding the moral horizons of beasts, and so deserves
our attention.

The promising candidate definition is offered by

Nicias, according to whom "courage is knowledge ( ε π ι σ τ ή μ η ) of what
2
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is to be dreaded and dared"

(Lach.196d).

Socrates immediately

points out that if this is true, then either

(a) no non-human

animal can have courage; or (b) non-human animals can be wise to a
degree rare even in human beings
admitted to be rare) .
brought

(since true courage has been

The counter-intuitive aspect of

out by Socrates

at

196e:

If Nielas

(a)

is correct,

is

then

"...necessarily the lion and the deer and the bull and the monkey
seem to have an equal share of inborn natural courage" (i.e., none
at all). And Laches, at this point in the dialogue disgruntled and
apparently

tired,

conceding

(a) ?

όμολογουμενον,

chimes

he
197a)

in

claims

to
that

certain

stress

the

"everybody

animals

are

improbability
agrees"
courageous.

of

(πάντες
The

universality of this agreement is reiterated at 197c.
Nicias embraces option (a) , and states that while true courage
is indeed rare, many beings display a thoughtless lack of fear
which might be confused with courage; "... rashness, boldness, and
fearlessness, with no forethought to guide it, are found in a great
number of men, women, children, and animals" (197b).

He suggests

that this heedless boldness be called θρασέα and thus distinguished
from proper courage (ανδρεία).

Significantly, he makes no move to

distinguish this thoughtless boldness as it is displayed by humans
from the ways it is displayed by the animals. Thus the implication
of his claim is to establish a form of courage-like behavior which
links humans and non-human animals.
The

subsequent

stages

of the

argument,

in which

Nicias'

definition of courage is shown to entail the whole of virtue and
3

perhaps

even

omniscience,

need

not

concern us here.

It

is

important to note, however, that both Socrates and Laches appear to
be

somewhat

dismiss

the

surprised that Nicias
idea

of

a

is willing

courageous

beast,

to

and

implication that all animals are thus alike

so

to

summarily

accept

in courage

the

(i.e.,

utterly lacking in it). The association of the lion with courage,
and the deer with timorousness, is firm in Greek literature from
Homer on, and Laches' emphatic and repeated assertion that courage
is

universally

granted

to

(some)

animals is testimony

to

significant popular sentiment in this direction.2
In Republic, the kind of courage required of the citizens in
the ideal city is denied to slaves (or slave-like natures) and to
beasts
below),

(or beast-like

natures;

I will

on the grounds that this

explain this

courage requires

opinion (όρθβ δ ό ξ α , 430b) produced by education.

ambiguity
firm right

A looser and more

precarious form of right opinion can be found in "the nature of a
beast and a slave" (. .. θ η ρ ι ώδη καί άν£ρα7το6ώ£η...) , but will not
enable them to display courage.
Numerous

translators,

including

Shorey, Cornford,

Grube,

Stirling & Scott, and Larson, render the ambiguous phrase "the
nature of a beast and a slave"
slave".

more simply as "a beast or a

They thus embrace the implication that beasts and slaves

can have right opinion of the looser and more precarious form.
This would be a rather startling concession to the non-human
animal's cognitive capabilities, though far less odd for the slave.
Fortenbaugh

has

argued

against
4

the

majority

translation.

Λ*

maintaining that the looser right opinion in question is restricted
to humans only, that we should translate the key phrase "slavish
and bestial", and that "'Bestial' is used as a pejorative label and
nothing more".3

Here I am inclined to agree with Fortenbaugh,

given Plato's normal usage of the term θ η ρ ι ώ δ η ς
below in section II) .
reason to

(of which more

Thus this Republic passage gives us no

suppose that Plato and Nicias were

in disagreement

concerning animal courage.
A passage

from Laws. however,

does.

At

Laws

963a,

the

Athenian Stranger refers to a form of courage in which both beasts
and children participate.

For "...a courageous soul comes into

being without reasoning and by nature (ανευ... λόγου και φύσει).
This aspect of courage is to be contrasted with intelligence and
practical wisdom, which do not appear in the absence of reasoning.
Elsewhere in Laws (710a-b), we find reference to a kind of natural
temperance

(σωφροσύνη) which also is said to occur naturally in

beasts and children.

This virtue if it exists in isolation from

other virtues is said to be of little worth.
are naturally

courageous

However, if beasts

and naturally temperate,

profile is not negligibly low.

their moral

To add one more element to this

profile, we should note that, also in Laws. animals who mate for
life are praised for leading lives which are

"holy and just,

remaining faithful to their first contracts of friendship" (840de).

And, here as elsewhere in Laws, a moral lesson for humans is

drawn from this observation about animal behavior.

The citizens

must be able to be at least as chaste as such beasts.45
5

As to the cognitive capacities of non-human animals, though
Plato nowhere explores them systematically, we can again locate
passages

which

speak to

the

cognitive traits to animals.

ascription

of

certain

human-like

Thus a possibly humorous comment by

the Eleatic Stranger in the Politicus hesitantly ascribes φρόνιμος
to the crane, in order to make the critical comment that cranes
would probably divide the life-world into cranes and everyone else,
just as the Stranger and Young Socrates have just divided it into
humans and everyone else (263c-d) .5

And in Republic. we find an

undoubtedly humorous reference to the philosophical nature of the
dog; insofar as dogs are unfriendly to strangers but fawn on those
they are familiar with, their "criterion of the friendly and the
alien is intelligence and ignorance"

(376b-c) .6

For this they

deserve to be considered philosophical and lovers of learning!
In spite

of the

fact that this

appears

to be whimsical,

the

comparison of the guardians to dogs in Republic is sustained and
striking.
Thus we see that, while Laches remains rather ambiguous as to
animal courage, and Republic demonstrates pretty flat opposition to
the idea with only humorous intimations of animal intelligence.
Laws evidences definite sympathy toward the beast as a moral being
of courage and temperance, with perhaps even some lessons to teach
humans about living good lives.
of ways.

We could explain this in a variety

First, one might suggest that the Athenian Stranger of

Laws is not to be identified with Plato's own philosophical outlook
even as closely as we tend to identify the Socrates of Republic
6
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with that outlook (however closely that should ideally be). Thus,
the mellower picture of the non-human animal glimpsed in Laws might
just be a dramatic feature of the Stranger"s persona. rather than
a

departure

by

Plato

from

a

former

mindset

about

animals.

Alternatively, we might note the fact that other shifts of emphasis
are represented in Laws. with its apparently greater interest in
the non-rational aspects of human nature (the drinking education,
the motions for infants,

etc.)? perhaps Plato is here relaxing

somewhat his strictures on the close connection between virtue and
reason.

And

finally,

it

is

tempting

to

speculate

about

an

Aristotelian influence on Plato's view of animals, at this late
stage of Plato's philosophical career.
But

also,

it

is

important

to

note

that

Plato's

earlier

negativity about animals may have been in part a product of a
polemical

situation

in the Athenian philosophical

scene.

For

positive references to animal behavior in nature were a feature of
certain sophists' agendas.
Gorgias

(481c ff.),

The views which Callicles advances in

according to which "natural" goodness

(the

exercise of strength and force to obtain what one desires)
explicitly

modelled

on

animal

analogies,

are

is

importantly

representative.7 This sort of view is parodied by Aristophanes in
Clouds, when Pheidippides justifies beating his father by reference
to the "chickens and other animals" who fight with their parents
(1427-1429).
there

between

He concludes his argument, "And what difference is
them

and

us,

except

resolutions? "8
7

that

they

don't

move

I believe

that

Plato*s

earlier

disinclination

to

credit

animals with moral attributes or cognitive abilities may well be in
part a reaction to what he viewed as the excesses of the "Nature
School" in his intellectual milieu.

He distances himself from this

school, and from its understanding of the relation between nature
and

human

life,

even

more

decisively

when

he

describes

the

bestialization of the human soul, a topic to which we now turn.

Section II:

The Beast in Human Shape

To counterbalance thé above hints at animal cognition and
virtue there are many fiercely negative comments about beasts in
the Platonic corpus, and the very phrase ώσπερ θηρίον functions as
a scathing insult.

Beasts are repeatedly characterized as the

grossest of hedonists, who would vote unanimously for pleasure as
the highest good (Philebus 67b), and who live to stuff themselves
with food and drink (Laws!83le).

The susceptibility of "snakes,

tarantulas, scorpions, and other beasts" to magic spells or charms
is used in a complex way at Euthvdemus 290a to insult speechwriters.

A human soul which is aware of its ignorance and not

disturbed by it is "indifferently wallows in the mire of ignorance
like a pig" (Rep. 535e). The person who pursues physical training
to the exclusion of intellectual development becomes a "hater of
arguments", or "misologist", who then abjures persuasion and lives
"by

force

and

in wildness

like

a beast"

(Rep. 411d).

And

Thrasymachus, in his famous initial outburst at 336b, is of course
described as ώσπερ θτγρίον.8
8
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The effect of this use of animals to deprecate certain forms
of human behavior and character is twofold: first, certain aspects
of the

nature

wallowing,

of the beast

snakes'

are highlighted

susceptibility

to

for

charmers,

scorn
many

(pig's

animals'

evident enjoyment of their meals, etc.); but secondly, the scorned
behaviors are located within the human domain, which moves the
human and the non-human animal into closer relationship.
are, so are some of us.

As they

Paradoxically, Plato's minatory use of

animal analogies to deplore certain human tendencies brings the
beast nearer our doorstep, as it were.

But at times Plato goes

further than this, and actually moves the beast indoors.
Plato makes a more elaborate use of the moral

charge of

"beastliness" ( θ η ρ ι ώ δ η ς ) than any other ancient Greek writer. This
is perhaps in part due to the fact that the term seems to have
become adaptable for this sort of semantic work only around the
third quarter of the fifth century.9 However this may be, Plato's
interest in beastliness as a human condition is notable.

We should

not make light of the fact that, of Plato's mythic depictions of
the human soul, the two most powerful and sustained intimately
involve non-human animals: Phaedrus with its charioteer and mixed
equine team,

and Republic with its psychic menagerie of "many-

headed beast", lion, and tiny inner person.

And while Platonic

myths cannot be treated as literal descriptions, neither of course
can they be dismissed as poetic fancies.
The human condition at its best, according to Plato, is to be
envisioned as the successful domestication of an inner beast or
9

group of them.10
difficult

and

This domestication is at times described as a

violent

process?

thus

in

Phaedrus

it

involves

bloodshed and pain, in Republic aggression and danger.11 The human
condition at its worst entails the triumph of the inner beast over
the

element

which

should

be

in

control,

and

is

thus

a

bestialization of the person.
Plato describes this bestialization in a variety of ways.

In

Politicus. it is said that a courageous soul in the absence of the
truth is inclined towards beastliness (άποκλίvei...προς θ η ρ ι ώ δ η ,
309e2-3).

In Laws. a poor or defective education is said to make

a person into the wildest of animals.
The human being is, as we say, tame; and just as when he
gets a correct education and has a fortunate nature he
becomes the divinest and tamest of animals, if he is not
sufficiently or not well trained he becomes the wildest
of all things that live on the earth. (766a)
Later in Laws, while discussing legislation against verbal abuse
the Stranger states that such language has a bestializing effect on
its user.
once

again

The part of the soul which was "tamed by education, is
made

wild",

and

the

verbal

abuser

"having

been

bestialized ( θ η ρ ι ούμενος) lives in ill-temper" (935a).
From both these passages we can see that the tameness or
gentleness of the human being is an achievement,
education; and it is eminently reversible.

a result of

The human, unlike the

beast, achieves its true nature only at great expense of effort?
also unlike the beast, whose nature is diachronically stable, the
human can lose the most valuable portion of its nature, its highest
humanity,

through

weakness,

settled
10

vice,

or

even

just

a

prematurely terminated education.
In the Republic’s interior zoo,12 even the individual beasts
can become further bestialized; thus the interior lion can become
a monkey under the influence of a disposition to flattery and
slavishness (59 0b ; cf. Phaedrus 24 0b on the flatterer as a terrible
beast and great harm).

This reminds us that the beasts within do

not function simply as negative elements to be suppressed as far as
possible.

The best human life will first domesticate, then nourish

these beasts in the best way possible; the small interior person in
Republic is described as caring for his beasts like a farmer tends
his

plants

(ewiμελησεται

ώσπερ

γεωργός,

589b).

Thus

their

animality is part of the whole creature's full humanity.
What actually is the difference between a depraved, illeducated, verbally abusive,

rancorous, greedy, and incontinent

human being, on the one hand, and a wild animal, on the other?
is

first tempted

to

say that the wild

animal

is much

One

to be

preferred, aesthetically and morally; and it can hardly be denied
that in some of Plato 's comparisons between depraved humans and
beasts, the latter suffer an injustice.
a more serious consideration.

But the question requires

Plato 's conception of the human soul

sharpens the question to a definite intensity,

for he is both

uniquely liberal in his use of anima1-ana1ogies for parts of the
human soul and uniquely intense in his commitment to the essential
importance of irai S e v a in constructing and maintaining a properly
human, non-bestial character.
It is tempting to answer that, no matter how depraved the
11

life,

in a human soul there remain the uniquely human elements

(tiny

person,

charioteer)

which

are

in

resuscitation and restoration to power.

principle
However,

capable

of

the force of

Plato's language in describing the struggle by which their hegemony
is achieved

in the virtuous

soul

leads us to countenance the

possibility, even the probability, of their indefinitely enduring
defeat in at least some lives.

In case of defeat, the human is the

moral equivalent of the beast and perhaps even wilder (Laws 766a,
808d-e, 874e-875a).

Conclusions:
We have seen that although Plato's emphasis on rationality and
calculative reason, along with his faith in the soul's immortality,
place him well to mark a clear-cut distinction between the human
and the beast,
locate.

that clear distinction is somewhat difficult to

While there is no strong evidence that Plato was inclined

to attribute human-like cognitive capabilities to animals,

the

absence of extended textual engagements with animal cognition make
this an uncertain issue.

And in the moral domain, there do seem to

be texts which suggest that a kind of natural virtue may be found
among animals.

These appear in the Laws. and are counterbalanced

by earlier denials of those same virtues to the non-human soul.
But most interestingly, Plato's descriptions of the inner dynamics
and characteristic moral failures of the human soul bring humans
and beasts into affinity.

Plato's emphasis on the precariousness

of the genuinely human condition, on its artifactual nature and the
12

necessity of constant vigilance lest the beast within break its
bonds and run to supremacy, have the implication that the clear
distinction between human and beast which the Cratvlus etymology
signals is itself a result, an achievement, and an ideal. It is in
effect

a

difficult

process,

rather

than

a

naturally

given

condition. For Plato, human nature must be won, and won again.

Notes:
1. I postpone dealing with the doctrine(s) of transmigration for
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the domain of non-human animals.
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O'Brien in "Xenophanes, Aeschylus, and the Doctrine of Primeval
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Classical Quarterly 35
(1985),
264-277;
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especially pp.266-8.
10. The contrast between "tame" or "gentle" (ήμερος) and "wild"
(άγριος) runs throughout the Republic's description of the soul's
three components (588b ff.); virtue consists in the domination and
taming of the beasts by the little person.
They are to become
friendly one another and subordinate to him - 589b. Phaedrus tells
of the "humbling" of the unruly horse (it is ταπεινωθείς by the
harsh reining of the charioteer, 254e7), and of its "enslavement",
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256b2.
11. Phaedrus: the unruly horse is repeatedly brought to his knees,
tongue and jaws bloodied by the bit? 254e. Republic: the beasts
within fight one another, bite and eat one another? 589a.
The
lowest one, with its many heads, is "terrible, huge, and
multiform"? 590e.
12. The description of the soul at Rep.588c ff. prompts Shorey to
one of his more delightfully unrestrained footnotes, in which a
quantity of poetry about inner beasts is collected, culminating in
Carl Sandburg: "Ο, I got a zoo, I got a menagerie inside my ribs!".
Shorey charges Sandburg with "nimeity" even while illustrating it
himself!
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